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Abstract
Prospects have never seemed better for a truly global approach to science to improve
human health, with leaders of national initiatives laying out their vision of a worldwide net-
work of related projects. An extensive literature addresses obstacles to global genomic
data sharing, yet a series of public polls suggests that the scientific community may be
overlooking a significant barrier: potential public resistance to data sharing across national
borders. In several large United States surveys, university researchers in other countries
were deemed the least acceptable group of data users, and a just-completed US survey
found a marked increase in privacy and security concerns related to data access by non-
US researchers. Furthermore, diminished support for sharing beyond national borders is
not unique to the US, although the limited data from outside the US suggest variation
across countries as well as demographic groups. Possible sources of resistance include
apprehension about privacy and security protections. Strategies for building public support
include making the affirmative case for global data sharing, addressing privacy, security,
and other legitimate concerns, and investigating public concerns in greater depth.
Introduction
Prospects have never seemed better for a truly global approach to science to improve human
health. In laying out their vision for President Obama’s PrecisionMedicine Initiative, Francis
Collins and Harold Varmus noted, “efforts should ideally extend beyond our borders, through
collaborations with related projects around the world” [1]. This vision is undergirded by a
track record of success with a series of projects initially conceived of and carried out as interna-
tional collaborations, including the Human Genome Project, the International HapMap,
ENCODE, and 1000 Genomes.
International collaborations have catalyzed efforts to support global data sharing, beginning
with the Bermuda Principles in 1996 [2]. The Toronto International Data Release Agreement
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built on Bermuda, and these efforts created a solid foundation for more recent expansion
through the Global Alliance for Genomics and Health [3–4]. An extensive literature addresses
obstacles to global data sharing, especially in the public health domain [5–7], but the scientific
community may be overlooking a significant barrier: people’s attitudes about acceptable uses
of their data. Public reticence to share data across national borders could derail worldwide sci-
entific and clinical collaborations.We explore the normative foundations of global data sharing
and suggest strategies to address the disconnect between scientific and clinical aspirations and
the apparent public concern about international data sharing.
The Case for Global Genomic Data Sharing
The simplest and most compelling argument for global genomic data sharing is instrumental—
global sharing enables the best science and ultimately the greatest contributions to human
well-being. Collins and Varmus point to data sharing as a way of enlisting “the world’s bright-
est scientific and clinical minds” in making sense of the anticipated wealth of data [1]. Studies
validate the belief that broad data sharing fuels scientific productivity. The human genes ini-
tially sequenced and kept as a proprietary resource by Celera Corporation, for example, were
cited by 20%–30% fewer research papers—and led to fewer diagnostic tests for those genes—
than the genes first mapped by the Human Genome Project and rapidly made public under the
Bermuda Principles [8]. Global collaboration is particularly valuable for complex studies of
gene—gene and gene—environment interactions [9]. Furthermore, some biomedical research
(e.g., rare disease research) is simply not feasible unless case data are collected and shared inter-
nationally. Collecting all the cases possible across the globemay be the only way to accumulate
enough data to understand a rare disorder. And even for common disorders, international data
sharing is important. Genomic variants associated with breast and ovarian cancer in the
BRCA1 and BRCA2 genes, for example, are still being discoveredmore than 20 years after the
genes were first sequenced;many millions of people have been tested, and the variants most
commonly associated with cancer differ among populations across the globe [10]. Clinicalmis-
interpretation can follow when whole populations are underrepresented in databases, as shown
by Manrai et al., for inherited cardiomyopathies [11]. As molecular classification enables ever
more refined taxonomies of cancer and other diseases, the case is strengthened for thinking
that the best science is global science. Of course, it is important to guard against a simplistic
assumption that “more is better”; the best global science depends on the availability of
resources for curation and other measures to assure both quality and equity [12].
The idea that the collective human genome is a common heritage of all humanity also reso-
nates globally. Article 1 of theUniversal Declaration on the Human Genome and Human Rights
states: "The human genome underlies the fundamental unity of all members of the human fam-
ily, as well as the recognition of their inherent dignity and diversity. In a symbolic sense, it is
the heritage of humanity" [13]. This universal human rights perspective informs the work of
the Global Alliance, including its Framework for Responsible Sharing of Genomic and Health-
Related Data [4].
Finally, reciprocity is a norm that powerfully influences human behavior [14]. Reciprocity
requires that, to the extent data resources in some countries are beingmade available to quali-
fied researchers globally, other countries have an obligation to reciprocate with openness.
DNA sequence databases benefit researchers worldwide. Restrictions that favor local advantage
threaten a global regime of scientific sharing. The UK Biobank has made a point of encourag-
ing and providing access to data and samples to qualified researchers across sectors “both in
the UK and internationally, without preferential or exclusive access for any user” [15].
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Public Resistance to Global Genomic Data Sharing
A reduction in public support for data sharing when the data will be used to support the profits
of private firms has received attention [16–17], and trust in academic researchers drops if they
have commercial affiliations [18]. The reluctance to share data across borders has received less
attention. Questions about domestic versus international data sharing are rarely included in
public opinion surveys.However, US surveys that have addressed this topic have consistently
found resistance to sharing across borders. There is no similarly robust data from other coun-
tries. The few studies that touch on international data sharing suggest that similar concerns
exist outside the US but also that some populations are supportive of international data
sharing.
Recent data come from a 2015 survey of 2,601 US adults who were asked, “Would you allow
the following types of researchers to use your samples and information for research?” The vast
majority favored sharing with researchers at the National Institutes of Health (79%) and uni-
versity researchers in the US (71%). The level of support for sharing with university researchers
in other countries, however, was only 39%, below the 52% level of support for sharing with
pharmaceutical or drug company researchers [19]. A 2008 survey of US military veterans
found a similar drop in support for sharing data with academic researchers in other countries
(43%) compared to US researchers (80%) [20]. Indeed, university researchers in other coun-
tries were the least acceptable category of data users in both surveys.
In March 2016, we conducted an online survey of 1,319 US adults focused on privacy and
security issues using Mechanical Turk, a marketplace for Web-based surveys run by Amazon
[21]. We defined “privacy” as “a condition where others have limited access to information
about you.” “Security” was defined as “the protections that are in place to keep your informa-
tion from being seen by people who do not have permission.” Of the respondents, 73% were
not at all to not very comfortable with their health information being accessed by academic
researchers outside the US, compared to 53% for academic researchers in the US (Fig 1). More-
over, 49% did not trust academic researchers outside the US to keep their health information
private (compared to 25% for academic researchers within the US), and 51% did not trust
Fig 1. Comfort with health information being accessed by US versus non-US academic researchers
(n = 1,319).
doi:10.1371/journal.pbio.2000206.g001
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academic researchers outside the US to keep their health information secure (compared to 26%
for US researchers) (Fig 2).
Data from outside the US indicate that concern about sharing across borders is not unique
to the US, although attitudes vary across countries and demographic groups. A 2007 popula-
tion survey of 2,400 Finns elicited data on willingness to allow use of research samples depend-
ing on the location of companies rather than academic researchers. In that survey, 38% of
respondents reported that they would allow use by international companies, while 61% of
respondents reported that they would allow use by a Finnish company [22]. However, a 2011
population survey of 3,196 Jordanians found that 23% reported that their decision to donate
biological sample(s) and information for biobanking would be positively influenced by “partic-
ipation of international researchers” (the fifth-rankingpositive influence), while 14.8% said
their decision would be negatively influenced by this factor (the fourth-ranking negative influ-
ence) (the other 59.6% selected “no effect”) [23]. A negative view of sharing with international
researchers was associated with increasing age and decreasing educational attainment. Finally,
a 2013–2014 Canadian survey used self-identification as a past or potential future donor of tis-
sue samples or genetic data to a biobank or genetic database as an inclusion criterion. Of the
114 individuals completing the survey, 54% selected “international scientific community”
when asked to indicate their preferred scope of data sharing (the other options were “a single
Canadian institution,” selected by 22.1%, and “undecided,” selected by 23.9%) [24].
Basis for Privacy and Security Concerns
Privacy and security are frequently mentioned as major sources of public concern related to
biobanking and data sharing more generally, and our findings support this emphasis. In the
traditional paradigm, anonymization or de-identification is the key to allowing genomic and
other health-related data to circulate freely without triggering privacy and security concerns.
Recent work suggesting that individuals whose data are included in a genomic database can be
identified despite adherence to recognized standards for de-identification challenges this para-
digm [25]. Also, anonymization is problematic if privacy is understood to include a right to
control access to information about oneself, in addition to an interest in being shielded from
risks of harm associated with the disclosure of personal information. Furthermore, even in
Fig 2. Trust in US versus non-US academic researchers to keep health information private and
secure (n = 1,319).
doi:10.1371/journal.pbio.2000206.g002
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purely consequentialist terms, the traditional paradigm has weaknesses. Data that are de-iden-
tified lose much of their value for research. Many uses of genomic data require continued abil-
ity to link to other data about an individual; the individual does not need to be identified in the
usual sense for most research uses, but links to clinical records, demographic data, environ-
mental exposures, and health outcomes at an individual level are often needed to draw infer-
ences about genomic variants. The ability to connect data about genomic variants to other
outcomes is a touchstone of the Global Alliance [4].
An emerging paradigm accepts a broad conception of privacy, which includes rights to
information about uses of data and several forms of control in line with fair information prac-
tices, and acknowledges the risk of re-identification. In place of an absolute guarantee against
harm, or a claim that re-identification is impossible, it rests on securing broad consent to data
sharing (or using a platform that allows for dynamic and granular consent) and continuing
efforts to minimize risk (for example, where linkages across records or datasets are critically
important, using non-identifying alphanumeric codes to approximate the privacy protection
associated with anonymization). Other features include new forms of governance that facilitate
ongoing participant engagement, transparency as a means of building trust and as a mark of
respect (including transparency about international data sharing), and accountability mecha-
nisms (including sanctions against those who fail to take appropriate steps to secure data or
who use data in ways that are not authorized) [4,26–28].
In addition, privacy and security concerns as well as regulatory restrictions on cross-border
transfers and data creators’ interests in retaining control have been the impetus for the devel-
opment of bioinformatics tools that facilitate querying of individual-level data across research
sites without centralized storage of those data [29–31]. One of these tools, DataSHIELD, is con-
structed so that only study-level statistics leave research sites. External researchers are therefore
unable to generate results for individual participants.
Other Possible Sources of Public Resistance
Beyond concerns about privacy and data security, there is a paucity of evidence regarding pos-
sible sources of resistance to sharing data with researchers in other countries. Nationalism and
concerns about economic competitiveness may be additional factors. Investment in biomedical
research is often promoted as an engine of national economic growth and competitive advan-
tage [32]. The link between prohibitions on cross-border data sharing and the promotion of
national interests in biotechnology prowess is not direct, however, and cooperation as well
competitionmay advance economic development.
General distrust based on concerns about use in controversial research or potential exploita-
tion may also be sources of resistance. Even pure data research may be highly controversial if,
for example, it involves linking a stigmatized condition to a particular population or social
group. Residents of low- and middle-income countries and indigenous peoples have distinctive
concerns about exploitation. Exploitation encompasses instances of “helicopter genetics,” the
descent of scientists from developed countries on developing countries to carry out research
that violates standards of research ethics, as well as the use of data without proper credit to
local data collectors and a lack of benefit sharing with local populations that contribute data
[5–7].
Strategies to Promote Global Genomic Data Sharing
The aspirations for global genomic data sharing are laudable and important. They may none-
theless confront public reluctance to share data across borders. Building public support
requires both improved communication about benefits and attention to privacy, security, and
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other legitimate concerns. First, the benefits of global data sharing are not immediately obvious
—the affirmative case for global sharing of genomic and other data must be made. The com-
mon heritage idea may resonate in regions of the world where solidarity is an important cul-
tural norm but is unlikely to prove as successful in countries like the US, where individualism
and patriotism are core values. The notion that the best science is global science should have
more universal appeal. Those focused on rare disease and precision medicine research have a
compelling case that progress can only be made if data are pooled globally. A strong, direct,
reciprocity-based argument is available where instances of in-country researchers benefiting
from another country’s resource can be cited, and it may be possible to activate reciprocity in a
more general way by conveying that “free riders” threaten the demise of nascent pro-sharing
norms that benefit all.
A second set of strategies can address potential sources of resistance. In countries such as
the US, built through immigration, it may be helpful for leaders of public health and research
funding agencies, researchers, and patient groups to communicate that each “nation of
nations” [33] has a stake in efforts to capture data frommany populations worldwide. Inter-
preting the BRCA variant of a woman born in Iceland whomoved to New York, or the gene
variant found in a child with epilepsy fromMalta or Malawi, may depend on such pooling of
data. More broadly, advocates for global data sharing can develop talking points that connect
sharing to scientific leadership and fulfillment of national economic aspirations. We note that
the legitimacy of this strategy rests on an investment by sponsors of global initiatives to ensure
that their projects are structured so that champions in all participating nations have a leader-
ship role and some control, and that benefits are fairly shared. In this respect, the work of the
Worldwide Antimalarial Resistance Network appears exemplary [12]. Advocates should also
consider briefing political leaders on the desirability of emphasizing cooperation as well as
competition in narratives that link biomedical research to national economic growth.
Advocates can address privacy and security concerns by building strong and secure plat-
forms for sharing while also providing information to the public about the stringency of pro-
tections that pertain to users in other countries. They must also remedy gaps by pushing for
stronger laws and other measures to address vulnerabilities and to penalize unauthorized re-
identification and breaches of privacy. Most countries do not strictly prohibit export of biospe-
cimens or data, but many impose restrictions such as compliance with EU standards for receipt
of data and biospecimens, de-identification (typically compatible with use of a non-identifying
code) or anonymization of data before transfer, and review and approval of the proposed trans-
fer by a research ethics board [9,34]. A few countries require a special permit or collaboration
with a local researcher, and requests for access to genetic data may be subject to additional
approval requirements (e.g., China, France, India, Mexico, Nigeria) [34].
Current efforts by the Global Alliance and others to develop common review standards,
procedures, and conditions for exchanging data should improve efficiencywithout
compromising the role ethics review boards can play in ensuring that privacy, security, and
concerns about potentially controversial or exploitative research are addressed and are per-
ceived as being addressed by the public and relevant subpopulations [4,35]. Among other
things, review boards can require specificationof the terms of use in an agreement that includes
sanctions for violations and is enforceable across jurisdictions [9]. Such measures must do
more work when transfers are from a region or country that has strong data protections to a
country, such as the US, that does not. In the absence of strong general legal protections, advo-
cates can push for targeted laws or standards that protect against the misuse of shared data
with stringent penalties for bad actors. We acknowledge that laws and standards are subject to
change and that implementation and enforcement efforts may falter. Hence, we strongly sup-
port the emerging privacy paradigm, with its emphasis on ongoing engagement, transparency,
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and accountability [4]. Furthermore, we recognize that some individuals and communities
may be justified in constraining cross-border data sharing in light of their analysis of risks and
benefits.
Finally, further study is needed to complete the picture by capturing public opinion in more
countries and to understand why support diminishes for sharing data and materials across bor-
ders in some countries and demographic groups. What are the sources of concern, and what
are the most effective responses? The strategies we outline are sensible and have little or no
down-side risk, but they are based on very limited evidence. Better understanding of the causes
for public concernmight lead to the development of more effective, targeted strategies to build
public support for an international information commons to advance biomedical research.
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